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Articles
Who is a Victim?
Graham Hughes*

It is fashionable these days to talk of "victimless crimes", but the
phrase can be dangerous for it may lead us with deceptive simplicity
around problems which deserve to be squarely faced. If everyone
agreed that an offense was truly without any discernible victim, then
arguments for its retention would be hard to imagine. But the disagreement is really about whether in particular cases we can convincingly identify victims who may legitimately claim protection. The
primitive model of the victim is the individual human being who is
knocked on the head or whose goods are stolen. Other candidates for
the role of victim also claim attention and invite us to consider what
social interests may legitimately be protected by the criminal law
other than the person and property of the individual. We shall now
pursue this theme by looking at two test cases - cruelty to animals
and abortion.
Cruelty to Animals
Many people (most, we may hope) find it extremely repugnant to
witness or imagine the infliction of torture or other kinds of cruelty
upon animals. And yet our relationships with animals and our moral
views about what it is permissible to do with them are very ambivalent and difficult to harmonize. We think it perfectly proper to kill
animals for food and the law does not generally prohibit killing
animals at all, as long as they do not belong to somebody else. I may
kill my pet dog any time I like, always provided that I do not do it in a
cruel manner. We also find it quite acceptable to exploit animal labor
and to control the lives of animals so that they are useful for human
purposes. For the most part, we still view animals as non-human
pieces of property with which we can deal as we please. The one
exception is the prohibition on treating them cruelly and this is of
*Professor of Law, New York University.
This article is a revised version of a chapter in a forthcoming book by the author
which will be published by Doubleday & Co.
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comparatively recent origin. In England and America such laws got
on the statute books in the mid or late nineteenth-century, through
active lobbying and pressure from a minority of enthusiasts. It does
not appear that there was at the time any great majority sentiment for
such legislation.
Today there is broadly based support for such laws and this may
be an interesting example of how legislation and law enforcement
can, with the passage of time, make an important contribution to
elevating the morals of the community. But we are still left with the
task of explaining exactly why it is wrong to be cruel to animals. One
explanation has been offered by Professor Louis Schwartz, one of the
architects of the Model Penal Code:
"It is not the mistreated dog who is the ultimate object of
concern; his owner is entirely free to kill him, though not cruelly,
without interference from other dog owners. Our concern is for the
feelings of other human beings, a large proportion of whom, although
accustomed to the slaughter of animals for food, readily identify
themselves with a tortured dog or horse and respond with great
sensitivity to its suffering."'
But this explanation, stressing as it does the element of shock or
offense to human sensibilities as the justification for prohibiting
cruelty to animals, is surely not acceptable. Suppose I get great
pleasure out of torturing my dog, but, realizing that my neighbors
would be upset by the howls of the tormented animal, I insulate and
soundproof my attic and take the dog up there to torture him at
leisure, leaving my neighbors quite undisturbed. It is true that, if I
were detected by the authorities and my conduct made public, my
neighbors would then suffer indignation and shock at contemplating
what I had done. Their reaction would be the same, and to an even
greater degree, had I been killing or torturing a human being. But this
would hardly justify the conclusion that the law of murder is designed
to protect the sensibilities of the public rather than the murderer's
potential victim. The shock to sensibilities is a result of knowing that
a murder has been committed but it is not the prime evil aimed at in
2
the law of homicide.
1. H. Schwartz, "Morals Offences and the Model Penal Code" (1963), 63 Columbia Law Review 669, reprinted in R. Wasserstrom (ed.), Morality and the Law
(Belmont, Calif. Wadsworth, 1971) 86, 94.
2. The same point has been made by J. Feinberg, "Harmless Immoralities and
Inoffensive Nuisances" in N. Clare and T. Trelogan (eds.), Issues in Law and
Morality (Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973) 83.
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In the same way, the rules about cruelty to animals are surely
primarily designed to protect animals, and not the sensibilities of
people. Bentham made this point very well, when he said that it might
one day come to be recognized that "The number of legs or the
villosity of the skin or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the caprice of
a tormentor. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it
the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But, the full
grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational as well as a
more conversable animal than an infant of a day, a week or even a
month old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail?
The question is not, 'Can they reason?', nor, 'Can they talk?', but,
'Can they suffer?" ' ' 3
The justification rests, then, on the proposition or axiom that it is
wrong to inflict suffering on sensate creatures. This leaves great
uneasiness about where we presently draw lines. You may uproot
plants, but you cannot tear limbs off dogs. And, although you may
pot tear limbs off dogs, you may kill them in a non-cruel manner if
they belong to you. We are left with a patchwork sort of morality
about animals, where we are, it seems, willing to embrace them with
ourselves in the circle of sensate creatures for limited purposes only.
In the theme of our discussion, we could say that animals are sometimes recognized as victims and sometimes not.
A further useful lesson flows from the animal example. The
discussion reveals that it would be a mistake to elevate privacy to a
preeminent position in this debate. The criminal law has the strongest
warrant for invading our privacy when the activity we choose to
pursue privately involves inflicting suffering on a non-consenting
sensate creature. Privacy assumes importance only when it negates
the only potential for inflicting harm that we can perceive in the
conduct in question. This will be the case with consensual sexual
conduct between adults but not with torturing dogs.
Abortion
The difficulties of deciding who is a victim worthy of protection
crystallize in the most agonizing fashion in the debate about abortion.
Here the last few years have seen a dramatic shift in public opinion in
the United States and also in the state of the law. Ten years ago we
3. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation (Harrison ed., 1948)
412 n. 1.
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might have thought it absurd if someone had forecast that in such a
short space of time the legislatures of some states would be permitting
abortions on demand. The decision of the United States Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade 4 , requiring such permissive procedures and
nullifying the laws against abortion was a surprise even to many of
those who most welcomed it. But the swift change in the law cannot
dissipate the moral argument. For the debate here is quite unlike the
one surrounding homosexuality or other sexual behavior. Those who
condemn abortion do not rest their case on principles of offensiveness
or unnaturalness. They assert quite simply that to abort a foetus is to
take a human life. This is unquestionably a moral position of the
strongest kind and must be dissolved by analysis or else accepted.
It is perhaps easiest to begin by looking at the empirical argument, often made by advocates of abortion on demand, to the effect
that women always have sought and always will seek abortions. This
impulse and apparent need are so strong for many women that the law
will not deter them and, in the absence of legalized safe facilities,
they will often end by getting themselves killed through unsafe
procedures. A major consequence of iroviding a legal method of
abortion will thus be to save the lives of many women.
While this assertion is incontestable, it does not in itself provide
an overwhelming argument for the legalizing of abortion and even
less for regarding abortion as morally unobjectionable. For, if those
who look upon abortion as the taking of a human life without
justification are correct, then they could reasonably argue that many
women will be deterred from having abortions by the existence of a
criminal prohibition, and in this way more lives might be saved than
lost. In any case, they might add, a quantitative analysis is not
appropriate when we are discussing a species of murder. Murder
should not be legalized because, when prohibited, it is a risky
business for the murderers, some of whom will lose their lives in
trying to kill others. The anti-abortion party is right in forcing us to
face the central moral question of what we are doing when we
practice abortion and how it may be different from murder.
The law itself has always refused to equate abortion with murder. The old common law made distinctions for the purposes of the
law of homicide between children born alive, those capable of being
born alive and a mere foetus. The crime of murder (or manslaughter)
could only be committed when the child had been born alive, which
4. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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the old cases defined as requiring total extrusion from the body of the
mother, though it was not necessary that the umbilical cord should be
cut. Before such time, but after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy,
English statutes designated causing the death of a foetus as the felony
of "child-destruction"; before the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy
the crime was known as abortion. Why should such distinctions be
drawn at all and, if they are to be drawn, why should they not be
distinctions between criminal and non-criminal conduct rather than
between degrees of crime?
The initial difficulty here has to do with the problem of defining
what quality it is that we seek to protect through our general moral
condemnation of killing and the laws which support it. Are we
concerned with protecting "life" or "human life" or the "human
personality" and how can we distinguish meaningfully between
these notions? The newly born baby is remarkably little different
from the baby a week or a month before normal birth, except for the
obvious circumstances of its new visibility. The recent conjugation of
the spermatozoon and the egg may look very different indeed but, as
the anti-abortion advocates always point out, it represents a separate
genetic package and, apart from intervention of disease or human act,
will inevitably and rapidly develop all the physical properties of a
human being, which are even now inexorably programmed into its
structure. This is the old "acorn to oak" analogy and those who
condemn abortion launch a powerful offensive when they challenge
its defenders to come up with a meaningful principle to justify
excluding the foetus from the category of human life.
Even if the debate shifts to the question of the starting point of
human personality, the defenders of abortion are in a difficulty.
Bentham pointed out, in a passage quoted above, that a grown dog or
horse is infinitely more "conversable" than a day old baby. In the
same vein, there seems little to support the contention that a baby a
few days after birth is more of an individual human personality than a
baby a little time before birth. The foetus in the womb is admittedly
invisible, unlike the baby after birth. But it is not obvious that our
inability to see the foetus is a sufficient reason to disqualify it from
enjoying human personality. For many people it is no doubt much
easier to kill a foetus than a baby, just because we cannot generally
see it move or smile or hear it cry. But many of us would also find it
easier to drop a bomb on a city far below than to stick a bayonet into
someone's body. As one writer has pointed out, it is after all a mere
contingency of nature that we cannot see babies in the womb. Science
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may very soon invent a device to enable us to make home movies of
babies before they are born. Assertions that babies before birth are
quite different creatures from babies after birth would then appear as
fatuous to everybody as they already do to those with medical and
5
biological knowledge.
In recent years the abortion debate has swung into new territory
with a package of arguments drawn from an emerging consciousness
and assertion of the rights of women. The one remarkable feature of
the unborn baby that does dramatically distinguish it from other
forms of human life is, after all, that it occupies another's body. We
certainly believe that we have important rights with respect to our
bodies - to take care of them or neglect them as we wish, to place
them in proximity to others, if they will permit it, or to withdraw
them. How then can a woman reasonably be told that she has no right
to expel an unwanted intruder who nestles in the very depths of her
body? Nobody would want to claim a right for a woman to kill her
born baby because she finds it annoying or inconvenient, but many
strenuously assert that the situation is morally quite different when
the question is one of disposing of a foetus for which the woman's
body is a receptacle.
But foetuses are surely not quite the same as tapeworms parasites which we may cheerfully decide to expel from our systems.
A parasite is an uninvited guest, but whether a foetus is uninvited
depends on the degree of the woman's responsibility for its implantation. If a woman is raped and becomes pregnant, then she clearly has
no responsibility for the conception and many moralists and some
legal systems have for a long time recognized her right to have an
abortion in these circumstances, though religious doctrine has generally denied the right even here. If a woman uses careful contraceptive
techniques when having sexual relations, but nevertheless becomes
pregnant through some unavoidable failure in the device used, then
again we could not say that she has intentionally or even negligently
brought about her pregnancy. But, if a woman neglects to use any
contraceptive precautions, it could reasonably be claimed that she is
responsible for her pregnancy, at least in the sense of being negligent
as to whether she became pregnant or not. 6

5. See R. Wertheimer, "Understanding the Abortion Argument" (1971), 1
Philosophy and Public Affairs 67, 91.
6. See J. Jarvis Thompson, "A Defence of Abortion" (1971), 1 Philosophy and
Public Affairs 47, 57.
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We might try to set up a moral frontier along these lines, viewing
abortion as permissible when the woman is not in this sense responsible for the pregnancy, and as forbidden when she has been negligent.
Such a position would not satisfy nost advocates of legal abortion,
nor would it match the present state of the law. Whatever its moral
merits, such a line of demarcation would also be quite impossible to
apply as a standard of legality. To entrust a public body with the task
of deciding whether a woman did or did not take reasonable contraceptive steps in the act of intercourse which led to her pregnancy
would be impractical and ludicrous.
Those who defend the present availability of abortion on demand are not without moral arguments. They can point out that, both
under the present state of the law, and under their own demands, there
remain certain restrictions on abortion. Under the recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, states may still prohibit abortions
after the second trimester of pregnancy. This allows prohibition at an
earlier date than the time which the old common law recognized as
the one where a foetus becomes "capable of being born alive." It
thus could be thought to serve as a reasonable although rough dividing line between a mere foetus and a baby capable of surviving as a
human being after detachment from the mother. Certainly before this
date, even from the very moment of conception, an entity exists
which is a potential human being. But, so the argument might run, the
potentiality of becoming a human being is an interest which must
yield to the personal right of the woman to determine whether she
wishes to carry something in her body to the terminus of birth.
Though nobody else has any right to destroy a potential human being,
the person who carries such a potentiality in her own body, and who
will have to pay a certain price to bring it to fruition, has such a right.
The moral foundation of this right is the extraordinary and in
some ways inhuman nature of the burden that its denial would entail.
If abortion involves the snuffing out of a potential human life, then to
deny a woman an abortion involves the suppression of her human
right to make decisions about the fate of her body and the course of
her life. We would immediately reject as barbarically unjust any
scheme which sought to compel selected women to become pregnant
and bear children, when they did not wish to do so. To compel a
woman to carry a foetus to term is a similar encroachment on her
human dignity, on her right to make a choice for herself whether to
have children or not.
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Here we must take into account the nature of the burden which
pregnancy imposes on a woman in our society. The carrying of the
child involves discomfort and perhaps danger to health. The process
of birth may be painful and again possibly attended by danger to
health and life. Once the child is born, the pressures of tradition and
established sentiment combine to persuade the woman that it is her
duty to bring up the child to maturity. Though this may impose great
hardship on her and radically change the shape of her life, few women
are able to resist the weight of the transmitted notion that duty
requires such a price once the child is born. The fact that the conception may be in part due to the woman's own negligence does not alter
the situation significantly. A mandatory obligation to carry a foetus to
birth and then rear a child is a cruel and unusual punishment for a
moment's carelessness, often the result of influences, temptations
and pressures which make cool calculation difficult.
Even those who use these arguments to advocate a woman's
right to abortion agree that the right is extinguished once the child is
born and takes on a full extruded existence. It is presumably, then,
the satellite or incubus character of the foetus in the body of the
woman which is decisive in entitling her to determine its disposition.
Here we would do well to remember that morality is not a manual of
saintliness nor a doctrine of reverence for all forms of life. Our
discussion of moral attitudes towards animals has already made that
clear. Morality may be regarded as a system of enlightened self
interest, consisting of rules and principles that make social life
possible. The system requires that we extend to others the protections
and considerations that we would claim for ourselves. This inevitably
thrusts forward questions about whom we will regard as members of
the group. Primitive moralities may have included within this circle
only members of the family or the clan or the tribe or the nation,
relegating others to the status of non-persons who might quite properly be attacked and enslaved or killed. An extension of our moral
horizon has brought us to the perception that there are, primafacie,
no significant differences between human beings with respect to the
basic duties that we owe them. While we remain very ambivalent
about the status of animals, many have concluded that there are
sufficiently significant differences between a human person and a
foetus to take the latter outside the sweep of the protective system.
The opponents of abortion are unmoved by such arguments and
will catechistically respond that the right of life cannot be displaced
by any interests having to do with another's freedom of choice. They
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will also challenge their opponents with a thin-end-of-the-wedge
argument. If the foetus is a non-person to be disposed of at the will of
the mother, why, they will ask, is the same not true of the gravely ill
or the mentally retarded or even of young babies? They do well to
raise that point, for there can of course be no guarantee that at some
time in the future someone will not point to the law on abortion as an
analogy justifying the killing of such people. In reply it could be said
that those who advocate a free choice for the mother as to abortion are
not asking for such choice with respect to live babies or mentally
retarded people and that significant differences can be shown between these classes. To hold the line rigidly to ensure the protection of
all persons born alive at least provides a workable criterion for
division.
But even if the arguments of the proponents of abortion have an
initial appeal, we are still left with an unresolved question about the
significance of the capability of the foetus to be born alive. Presumably not even the most committed advocate of abortion would want to
legalize the killing by a mother of a partially extruded baby in the
process of birth. How far back, then, should the line be drawn? One
problem here is that advancing medical techniques may eventually
force us into responses which would come close to denying the right
to abortion altogether. Suppose that doctors may at some time in
the future be able to remove a three month old foetus from the
womb and nurse it to the same development as a normally born
baby. Would the advocates of abortion then find it necessary to
retreat to a position of permitting abortions only during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy?
The dilemma is more apparent than real. If medical science
progresses to the point where most foetuses after removal from the
womb could be brought to maturity, the case for abortion would be
strengthened rather than weakened. It might be better to say that the
demand for abortion would disappear and be replaced by a demand
for an early termination of pregnancy and relief from the obligation to
raise the child. For the mother could then be relieved of her unwanted
baby at her request without the necessary loss of a potential human
life. If there is felt to be a legitimate state interest in bringing the
potential life to fruition, then the detached foetus could be brought to
maturity and thereafter cared for at the expense of the state and in
facilities provided by the state. The mother requesting the premature
termination of pregnancy would forfeit all parental rights with respect
to the child, a price she would presumably be willing to pay.
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The hypothetical does, however, sharpen the outlines of two
issues which recent debate over abortion has not fully brought out.
The first is the need to clarify whether the case for abortion involves
the assertion of a right to extinguish the life of a foetus or only the
demand for the early termination of a pregnancy. At the moment the
two possibilities generally merge into one, but this is only a contingency of the present state of medical science. If medicine were able to
bring an early detached foetus to maturity outside the mother, and he
state assumed the duty to care for the child, the advocates of abortion
would have to clarify whether they would be satisfied with such an
arrangement or whether they were asserting a right to terminate the
life of the foetus. The second demand would be much harder to
justify.
Secondly, the hypothetical shows that the case for abortion
weakens in proportion to the lessening of the burden pregnancy
imposes on the mother. If the state regularized good arrangements by
which unwanted children were raised in a manner generally accepted
as being as healthy, happy and promising for the future as the average
upbringing a child receives in a middle class home, then the only case
a woman could make for abortion would be to be spared the period of
pregnancy and the process of birth. These burdens are certainly not
inconsiderable, but if it became possible to detach a foetus at an early
stage from the mother, the burden would become slight indeed. Let
us say that such detachment became safe for the foetus five months
into pregnancy. Would a woman three months pregnant then have a
right to demand abortion at that time, on the ground that she could not
be subjected to the imposition of carrying the child for two more
months? This example reveals that the moral arguments for and
against abortion on demand are to a considerable extent dependent on
the present state of medicine and social arrangements for the care of
children.
The Law on Abortion in the United States
At the behest of litigants American courts have been forced to plunge
into these thickets of arguments, charged with the task of weighing
them against the language of the Constitution and emerging with
authoritative determinations. As the old uniformity of state prohibition of abortion began to crumble and some states (notably New
York) enacted very permissive abortion legislation, attacks were
mounted from both camps.
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The New York statute which permits abortion by qualified
medical practitioners in proper facilities on the request of the pregnant woman up to the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, was challenged in the case of Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals
Corp. 7 The plaintiff contended that an unborn child is a "person"
who is entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as well as the similar clause in the New
York State Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that
no state "shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The New York Court of
Appeals denied the claim and upheld the New York statute in a
somewhat laconic opinion, ruling simply that there was no authoritative constitutional interpretation of the meaning of "person", which
was therefore a proper matter for legislative determination.
In theByrn case the plaintiff was asking the courts to strike down
a state legislative determination that abortion was permissible. Their
refusal to do so is in no way a precedent for the conclusion that a state
statute prohibiting abortion is unconstitutional. Both statutes could
be allowed to stand, in different jurisdictions, under the theory of the
Byrn case itself that the matter is one for legislative judgment. But
carefully orchestrated attacks were being planned which would compel the federal courts to decide squarely whether it was constitutionally permissible to prohibit abortion. The issue was finally seized and
determined by judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States,
early in 1973, in the companion cases of Roe v. Wade 8 and Doe v.
Bolton. 9
The Roe case challenged a Texas statute which made procuring
an abortion a criminal offense, unless it was done "by medical advice
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." A synopsis of the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in this vitally important opinion
serves both as an example of the Court's working at this highest level
of constitutional decision making and as a basis for an evaluation of
the decision itself.
The Court began the substantive part of its opinion with a review
of attitudes to abortion through the ages and in different cultures,
pointing out that, even in common law countries, the rigorous prohib7. 31 N.Y. 2d. 194 (1972).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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ition of abortion as a serious felony at all stages of the foetal life is a
comparatively recent creation of nineteenth-century statutes. Part of
the historical explanation for the passage of these statutes seems to
have been a concern for the protection of the mother. But if this was
the original legitimate state concern, then its foundation has disappeared with the advance of medicine, which has developed simple
and safe techniques for abortion, at any rate during the early stages of
pregnancy.
Other state interests of a legitimate kind are identifiable. The
Court recognized that as pregnancy progresses, the abortive procedure becomes more complicated and somewhat more hazardous, so
that the state may legitimately require that the operation only be
performed in adequate facilities. Then, in the latter stages of pregnancy, as the foetus becomes viable (that is capable of independent
existence), the state may properly assert an interest in protecting
prenatal life and thus prohibit abortions altogether. Those who condemn abortion argue, the Court acknowledged, that life begins at
conception and the state interest is therefore apparent from that
moment. This position insists that there is a duty on the part of the
state (rather than a mere interest) to protect human life. But the Court
was not persuaded by this argument. It pointed out as the New York
court had done inByrn, that there is no constitutional guidance on the
meaning of "person" which is the entity protected in the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But Byrn had used this point only to
reach the conclusion that the state had a right or privilege to permit
abortion. The Supreme Court put the reasoning to much more devastating use in reaching the conclusion that the state has no right to
prohibit abortion.
Taken alone, this premise simply does not support the conclusion. A judgment that a foetus is not constitutionally protected is not
dispositive of the state's power to protect it if it chooses to do so.
Legislation is not to be confined to the four corners of what is
mandated by the Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution
which imposes a duty on states to protect grey squirrels, but, if there
is any reasonable basis at all for wishing to preserve the species, a
state clearly may do so by penal legislation. We need to be instructed
why states have a legitimate interest in protecting the foetus capable
of being born alive but no sufficient interest in protecting a foetus
before the time it becomes viable.
The Court attempted to supply this link by dwelling on a
woman's right to personal liberty, grounded in the Fourteenth
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Amendment, and the growing constitutional recognition of a right to
autonomy. This recognition represents a revival in American constitutional law of the once discredited notion of substantive due
process. Used by a conservative Supreme Court in the early years of
this century to strike down social legislation, substantive due process
was so infected with the taint of economic reaction dressed in a
judicial garb that it languished in the shadows for decades. Now it has
reappeared dramatically as a vehicle for the enlargement of personal
liberties sheltered from state intervention.
The starting point of the revival of the doctrine was the Supreme
Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,10 a suit which challenged
a Connecticut statute which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives even to married persons. In Griswold, the majority of the
Supreme Court relied on constitutional notions of privacy which it
derived from the emanations or penumbra of several provisions of the
Bill of Rights. At least one Justice invoked more forthrightly the
protection of "liberty" afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Eisenstadt v. Baird,11 the access to contraceptives for married persons was extended to the unmarried by use of the equal protection
doctrine. In this way the Court had begun to build up a concept of
"fundamental rights" of constitutional dimension having to do with
the personal regulation of one's sexual life and the procreation of
children. In Roe v. Wade this development took a great step forward
in the recognition of a fundamental right in a woman to elect whether
to carry a foetus to term or dispose of this burden that she carries
within her body. Once a right is recognized as fundamental it cannot
be dislodged by a mere showing of some state interest. To intervene
validly the state must show what the Supreme Court has come to call a
compelling interest. In the abortion context the Court held that the
state's interest in protecting potential life only becomes "sufficiently
compelling" at the moment when the foetus becomes viable.
This analysis enabled the Court to devise a neat trimester division of adjustment between the competing interests of the state and
the woman. For the first three months the abortion decision must be
left to the choice of the woman and the medical judgment of her
physician. In practice this means abortion by untrammeled choice.
The situation is substantially the same for the second trimester,
except that the state, in promoting its interest in the health of the
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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mother, may regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. This clearly would not countenance
prohibition, but is meant to permit regulations about the medical
facilities in which the operation may be performed. For the last
trimester, which is the stage where the foetus has become viable, the
state may regulate and, if it chooses, prohibit abortion, except where
good medical judgment holds it to be necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother. It should be noticed that, even in the last
trimester, the state may permit abortion by choice if it so desires.
There is a strong congruence between the Court's constitutional
reasoning and the ethical discussion of abortion earlier in this article.
This demonstrates the inevitable overlap of the methods and materials of constitutional and moral argument. At the same time a crucial
difference becomes apparent. The ethical debate about abortion,
divorced from considerations of constitutionality, reveals some difficulty in asserting a woman's moral right to destroy a foetus. The
argument is a nicely balanced one and we might well decide that the
deep division in public opinion, taken together with the disagreement
among moral philosophers, renders imprudent any state intervention.
This would favor leaving the decision to the individual conscience of
the pregnant woman. Legislation prohibiting abortion would in this
light be seen as unwise.
But the task of the United States Supreme Court in applying the
Constitution is not to strike down state legislation that it regards as
unwise. A much stronger judgment, to the effect that the state law
violates a constitutional or fundamental right without a compelling
justification, must be arrived at before a statute should crumble. In
the absence of any express constitutional reference to abortion, such a
right can only be located in the Fourteenth Amendment's general
concept of liberty or by a cumbersome extrapolation of the idea,
expressed in Griswold, that a general right of privacy is to be deduced
from the implications of numerous Amendments. The latter theory
appears here to be particularly ill suited. The claim to have an
abortion has almost nothing to do with the core concept of privacy. It
is not a demand that others should not invade or intrude upon an
activity which one reasonably expects to keep hidden. Instead it is a
claim that others cooperate in providing facilities and services to
reach a desired change in the body of the woman. As such it is more
natural to think of it as a claim to autonomy which can certainly be
made to fit under the "liberty" concept of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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But why did a woman's claim to have an abortion suddenly
become guaranteed by the Constitution in 1973, when no court had
held to that effect before? Does this lend credence to the charge that in
such fundamental matters Americans are at the mercy of the shifting
whims of nine non-elected persons?
The decision is not so indefensible, for Roe v. Wade, though a
considerable leap, was not reached quite without stepping stones.
Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird had
adumbrated an emerging right for individuals to control the consequences of their sexual activity by making personal determinations
about regulating conception. Such decisions may be fragile underpinnings for Roe v. Wade, but they provided at least a rudimentary
scaffolding of precedent. More important, surely, was the actual
assertion of a right to have an abortion by many women and a
recognition of that right by many men. To claim a right is certainly
not the same as having a right, either in morality or law. But when
many people vigorously put forward a claim and passionately regard
its denial as an injustice, then we have an obligation to weigh the
demand carefully and to accede to it unless the opposing arguments
are very strong. While it may not be possible to count heads in
majority and minority terms, it is clear that by 1973 many women had
come to see the state of the law on abortion as a simple denial of their
human rights, and many men agreed with them. In a democracy, a
Supreme Court is surely right in paying heed to such developments
when it comes to pronounce what are and what are not fundamental
rights.
This is not to say that the decision in Roe v. Wade can be
received with uncritical enthusiasm. The Court might have done a
stronger job of building an acceptable chain of reasoning. A more
acute and penetrating exposition of the constitutional lineage of a
woman's fundamental right to control her body as she pleases, even
when pregnant, would have been welcome. And why exactly does a
state have a compelling interest which permits it to prohibit the
abortion of a viable foetus, but has no such interest before the foetus
becomes viable? The Court laid this proposition down flatly, unsupported by analysis or argument. A comparison of the abortion decisions with recent Supreme Court decisions on pornography 12 may
lead to further uneasiness.
12. 410 U.S. 113, (1973).
13. See ParisAdult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U S. 49 (1973).
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It appears that a state has a sufficient interest to uphold constitutionally its prohibition on the discreet display of pornography in
places of public accessibility. But it does not have a sufficient interest
to uphold constitutionally a prohibition on the abortion of a nonviable foetus. Is this because the right of the woman to dispose of the
unwanted contents of her body is "fundamental," while the claim to
have discreet public access to erotically stimulating material is not?
Such a proposition may be reasonable but one would like to see it
brought out and looked at carefully. Or is it that the social dangers of
permitting the discreet availability of pornography are much more
threatening than the social harm done by aborting the non-viable
foetus? Or some combination of these grounds?
Constitutional doctrine now holds that a state may intervene
with prohibitions to prevent the somewhat tenuous possibility of
aesthetic deterioration, but that the snuffing out of a living organism,
which is a well advanced form of a potential human being, provides
no such justification. This is, when put in that fashion, so surprising a
position that harder and more penetrating delving into these questions
would have to be forthcoming before we could regard the Supreme
Court decisions in these fields as good examples of the judicial art and
craft.

